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I. Introduction
InNollanv. CaliforniaCoastalCommission1 andDolanv. City ofTigard,2
the Supreme Court imposed federal constitutional limits on governments that
attempt to exact property from landowners in return for development
approval.' In Nollan, the Court ruled that these exactions violate the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment unless there is an "essential nexus" between
the required concessions and the public impact of the proposed development. 4
The Court held that the California Coastal Commission violated the new nexus
standard when it demanded that the Nollans give up a lateral beachfront
easement in exchange for a building permit.' In Dolan, the Court added to the
nexus test, declaring that an exaction of property must be "roughly proportional" in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed land development.'
The Court again found a taking when a landowner was required to give up an
easement in land in exchange for a development permit.'
Although there always has been some disagreement about the crux of
these decisions - whether it was the fact that government engaged in a physical invasion of land,8 the potential abuse of government permitting power, 9 or
1.
2.
3.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (finding govern-

ment's ability to extract concessions from landowners limited by Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (stating that Fifth Amend-

ment requires "rough proportionality" between property exaction and developmental impact).
4. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
5. Id. at841-42.
6. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
7. See id. at 394-95 ('We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies do not
show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and [Dolan's] proposed new building.").

8. See Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1608 (1988)
(suggesting that "talismanic force of 'permanent physical occupation' is the cornerstone of
Nollan"). Interestingly, Michelman later characterizes Nollan as a case involving a "regulatory
restriction on use." See Frank I. Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in LmIERTY, PROPERTY & THE FUTURE OF CONSTrrUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127,140 (Jennifer Nedelsky ed., 1990).
9. See Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that "the object of the Court's holding in Nollan
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a simple desire on the part of the Court to elevate property rights in the
constitutional hierarchy'0 - the cases at least seemed to call for increased
judicial scrutiny of land use conditions.'" Yet, while some post-Dolanfederal
and state cases indeed reflect a more skeptical stance toward the permitting
process," many others have discovered exceptions to the essential nexus rule13
that preclude its application to many, if not most, of the exactions commonly
imposed by government. In particular, there is great confusion over the
applicability of the essential nexus to exactions that amount to a demand for
money 4 and to exactions that originate from a legislative act.." Many courts
have concluded that both types of land use conditions fall outside the scope
of Nollan and Dolan.
This Article contends that courts misread Nollan and Dolan and undermine the purposes of the Takings Clause when they hold that the essential
nexus does not apply to monetary or legislative exactions. Part II briefly
reviews Nollan and Dolan and summarizes the rules that flow from each of
those decisions. Part II surveys post-Dolan lower court decisions dealing
with monetary exactions and explores the judicial debate over relevance of the
and Dolan was to protect against the State's cloaking within the permit process 'an out-and-out
plan of extortion'").
10. See Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Oough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of
Tigard on Local Governments' Land-Use Powers, in TAKIOS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LucAs 219,219 (David L. Callies ed.,
1996) (stating that Court's takings cases, including Nollan and Dolan, "clearly signaled the
Court's determination to provide greater protection for private property rights").
11. See Mark W. Cordes, LegalLimitson DevelopmentExactions: Respondingto Nollan
and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. L. REV. 513, 534 (1995) (noting that Dolan "Court's analysis demonstrated a seriousness of review to protect unjustified intrusions on property interests"); Hetzel
& Gough, supra note 9, at 232 (commenting that Nollan applied "intermediated level of
scrutiny"); Douglas W. Kmiec, The OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1649 (1988) (noting that parts of Nollan call for
"heightened intermediate scrutiny of [government's] means").
12. See David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives
on PropertyRights Have Changedfrom Penn Central to Dolan and What State and Federal
CourtsAre Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 568-71 (1999) (reviewing post-Dolan
cases that find taking due to impermissible exaction).
13.
The term "essential nexus" is used throughout this Article to refer to both the Nollan
nexus test and the Dolan rough proportionality standard, unless clearly noted. The conjunction
is appropriate here because both prongs are applied in the context of impact fees and legislative
exactions. It is important to keep in mind, however, that it is misleading to address the rough
proportionality and nexus tests in the same breath in the permit denial context because only
Nollan applies there. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703, 721
(1999) (holding "rough proportionality" test inapplicable to permit denial, but affirming jury's
right to consider whether denial substantially advanced legitimate state interests).
14. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
.15.
See infra note 114-48 and accompanying text.
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source of the exaction. Part IV argues that the purposes underlying Nollan
and Dolan and the Takings Clause compel application of the essential nexus
to both monetary and legislative exactions. Finally, Part V concludes that
courts should apply the essential nexus test equally to all land use conditions,
not only because the thrust of the cases requires this application, but also
because the most narrow holdings of Nollan and Dolan are rendered meaningless without an integrated and consistent takings doctrine in the exaction
context.
II. A BriefReview ofNollan and Dolan
Nollan burst onto the scene in 1987 as part of a "trilogy" of regulatory
takings cases decided that year. 6 The case had its genesis, however, in a land
use process that dated to the 1970s." Since that time, the California Coastal
Commission required coastal landowners to dedicate easements across their
property when seeking permission to improve their land." In the early 1980s,
the Commission set its sights on James and Marilyn Nollan after they applied
to replace a dilapidated 504 square-foot beach "bungalow" that had fallen into
such disrepair that it could no longer be rented out' 9 with2a a new "three-bedroom house in keeping with the rest of the neighborhood.
The Commission informed the Nollans that they could have the necessary permits as long as they agreed to dedicate a public access easement
across the dry sand area of their lot.2' In the Commission's view, the easement was proper because the Nollan's house "would increase blockage of the
view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development of 'a "wall" of residential structures' that would prevent the public 'psychologically ...

from

realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to
16. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987) (holding that compensation is always remedy for regulatory taking regardless of whether government removes offending regulation and thus makes taking "temporary");
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501-02 (1987) (finding no
taking when state of Pennsylvania denied coal company right to extract its coal from beneath
occupied land); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding that
attempt to extort easement for building permit violates Takings Clause unless compensation is
paid). For a general discussion of all three cases, see Kmiec, supranote 11.
17. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "regulation to ensure
public access to the ocean had been directly authorized by California citizens in 1972").
18. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that "[tlhe specific deed restriction to which
the Commission sought to subject them had been imposed since 1979 on all 43 shoreline new
development projects" in Nollan's vicinity).
19. Id. at 827.
20. Id. at 828.
21. Id. at 828-29.
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visit. "'I It also found that the house was likely to jeopardize public access by
increasing "private use of the shorefront."' " Disagreeing with the Commission's conclusions, the Nollans turned to the courts in an effort to bar the
Commission from imposing the dedication condition and to have the condition
declared a taking without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. After an extended foray through the California
25
24
courts, the Nollans appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The issue before the High Court in Nollan was whether the Takings
Clause allowed the Commission to require an "uncompensated conveyance"
as a condition for issuing a land-use permit when it could not do so outright.26
In the Court's view, this question depended on whether the condition "substantially advances legitimate state interests. '27 Disposing of the "legitimate
state interest" prong by assuming that the provision of public beach access
was a proper purpose,' the Court focused on the lack of congruence between
the easement demanded of the Nollans and the purposes articulated by the
Commission.29 A "lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction,"3 ° was critical because: "[U]nless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as [a] development
22.

Id.

23. Id. at 829.
24. "On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus
asking the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition." Id. at 828. The
superior court subsequently issued an order requiring the Commission to hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine if the proposed house "would have a direct adverse impact on public
access to the beach." Id. After this hearing resulted in findings adverse to the Nollans, they
returned to superior court to attack the merits of the Commission's findings and to assert the
constitutional challenge. See id.at 829 (arguing that condition violated Takings Clause of Fifth
Amendment). The superior court agreed with the Nollans that the condition was unwarranted
because the evidence failed to show that the house would actually have a "direct or cumulative
burden" on beach access. Id. The victory was short-lived, however, because the California
Court of Appeals reversed and additionally held that the dedication requirement did not amount
to ataking. Id. at 830-31.
25.
26.

Id. at 831.
Id at 834. The Court explained:

Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public
access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on
their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking.
Id.
27.
28.

Id.
Id at 834-36.

29. See id.at 837 (stating that "constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition fails to further the end advanced as the justification").
30.

Id.
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ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an 'outand-out plan of extortion."' 3'
Having laid the legal framework, the Court quickly determined that the
lateral beach access exaction imposed on the Nollans did not advance the
Commission's stated purposes: It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already
on the public beaches be able to walk across-the Nollans' property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also
impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to
using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house.3'
As a result, the Commission's exaction could not be treated as a proper
exercise of the police power.33 In the end, California "was free to advance"
public access along the coast, but if it wanted "an easement across the
'
Nollans' property, it must pay for it."34
Nollan thus established that an "essential nexus" must exist between a
development condition and the amelioration of a legitimate public problem
arising from the development.3 5 Although the Court does a poor job of
defining the parameters of the test, suggesting that it simply requires a correspondence between the government's purposes and its means,36 its reasoning
and holding clearly show that the raw nexus test requires (1) a legitimate state
interest or purpose; (2) a connection between that interest and the land use
exaction chosen to address it; and (3) a minimal connection between the
impacts of the proposed development and the land use exaction. 37 The Court
31. Id.
32. Id. at 838-39.
33. Id. at 839.
34. Id. at 841-42.
35. Id. at 837-39. For an exceptional discussion of the bifurcated nature of the nexus test,
see Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 356-57 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). See also Jan 0.
Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's
Exaction Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893,904-08 (1995) (explaining bifurcated analysis of Dolan).
36. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). The Court observed that,
without a nexus, a "condition... utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for
the prohibition."
37. Id. at 838-39. In this regard, it is important to remember that the Court struck the
easement condition imposed on the Nollans in part because it did not reduce "any obstacles to
viewing the beach createdby the new house." Id. at 838. The centrality of the requirement that
a land use condition address a problem traceable to the proposed development is seen by
considering several hypothetical situations. As the Court noted, the Commission permissibly
could have required the Nollans to supply a viewing area on their property in return for a
building permit. Id. at 836. This condition would pass constitutional muster because it would
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left unanswered the question of just how close a connection there must be
between development exaction and development impact, as the beachfront
easement demanded of the Nollans failed to meet even the loosest standard.3"
In Dolan,the Court set out to finish what it started in Nollan. In Dolan,
the City of Tigard required Florence Dolan to submit to several exactions in
return for permission to expand a plumbing and electrical supply store and to
pave an enlarged parking area. 9 Citing concerns that Dolan's development
would lead to more storm water runoff and flood potential,' the local Planning Commission demanded that Ms. Dolan "dedicate the portion of her
property lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm
drainage system.""' In addition, the Commission required Ms. Dolan to
dedicate a fifteen-foot strip of land along the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway, over and above that which was needed for the storm water system.42
The Commission justified its decision on the ground that it "could offset some
of the traffic43 demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in traffic
congestion. 1
In, considering whether the dedication conditions were consistent with
Nollan," the Court explained that it was necessary first to determine "the
advance the state's interest in protecting views of the ocean by addressing a problem (loss of
view) directly caused by construction of the Nollans' house. Id. But a different outcome would
result if the Commission were to require the Nollans to give up a vertical access easement across
their lot so that the public could get from a road fronting the house to the public beach beyond.
Although this condition undoubtedly would promote beach access and, therefore, "further the
[public access] end advanced," it still would fail the nexus test because construction of the
house could not cause the public access problem. Regardless of whether the lot was improved
by just a "bungalow," or nothing at all, it would remain private property and, therefore, offlimits to the general public at pain of criminal trespass. Thus, it would be difficult to see how
the requirement of a vertical access easement "reduces any obstacles" to beach access "created
by the house."
38. Id. at 838. The Court stated, "[W]e find that this case does not meet even the most
untailored standards." Id.
39. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994).
40. Id. at 382. The western and southwestern portions of the lot in which the expansion
was to take place bordered a creek, the year round low of which rendered "the area within the
creek's 100-year floodplain virtually unusable for commercial development." Id. at 379.
41.
Id. at380.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 381-82 (quoting Commission findings).
44. Id. at 383. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari after both the Oregon Court
of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court held that the bikeway and floodplain dedications
demanded of Ms. Dolan were "reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of [her] business," and, therefore, permissible under Nollan. Thus, in granting certiorari, the Court intended
to resolve "an alleged conflict between the Oregon Supreme Court's decision and our decision

in Nollan." Id.

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 373 (2002)
required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact
of the proposed development. 45 After concluding that a minimal nexus
existed between the city's interest in flood prevention and reduced traffic
congestion and the land dedications it sought from Ms. Dolan,46 the Court
turned to state courts for guidance on the question of the "required degree of
connection."4 7 Noting that a "reasonable relationship" test was "closer to the
federal constitutional norm,"4 the court adopted this intermediate standard.49
However, to avoid confusion with the "rational basis" test central to Equal
Protection analysis, the Court held that "'roughproportionality'best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."" ° The
Court summarized the new standard as follows: "No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized
both in nature and extent
determination that the required dedication is related
'
115
development.
proposed
the
of
impact
to the
When it applied the "rough proportionality" test to the facts at hand,
the Court concluded that the City of Tigard failed to meet its requirements
when it "demanded more" from Ms. Dolan than an open space reservation:
"[The City] not only wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it
also wanted petitioner's property along Fanno Creek for its greenway system.
The City has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private
one, was required in the interest of flood control." 2 The Court continued:
"It is difficult to see why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner's
floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city's legitimate interest
in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its
45. Id. at 386. The Court stated: "Ifwe find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the
required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed
development. We were not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that
the connection did not meet even the loosest standard." Id.
46. Id. at 387-88.
47. Id. at 386. According to the Court, states accepted "very generalized statements as
to the necessary connection" between an exaction and a development; a "very exacting correspondence," under which the exaction fails if it is not "directly proportional to the specifically
created need"; or a "reasonable relationship" test, described as an "intermediate" standard. Id.
at 389-90.
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. (emphasis added). An open space reservation condition would comport with the
essential nexus test because it would "likely confine the pressures on Fanno Creek created by
petitioner's development." Id. at 393.
52. Id.
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request."53 On the other hand, while the city's demand for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway was sufficiently related, in theory, to an increase in
traffic that might arise from the new store, 4 the Court refused to uphold that
exaction because there was no clear showing that it was indeed roughly
proportional to the impacts of Ms. Dolan's development.5 5
Dolan thus refined the Nollan nexus test in two important ways. First,
it held that exactions must be roughly proportional in nature and extent, not
merely related, to the impacts of a proposed development.5 6 Second, it shifted
the burden of showing the required degree of connection to the govenmment.5
II1.The Searchfor the Limits of the EssentialNexus Requirement
In the years since Dolan, lower courts consistently have applied the
essential nexus test to land use exactions similar to those challenged in Nollan
and Dolan. 8 Indeed, they have had surprising little difficulty applying the

dual aspects of the test to strike down exactions when presented with facts
similar to those in Nollan and Dolan.59 Thus, unlike the Court's other regula53. Id.
54. Id. at 395. The Court stated:
[W]e have no doubt that the city was correct in finding that the larger retail sales
facility proposed by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of the Central Business District... Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use.
Id.
55. Id. at 395-96. The city's conclusion "that the creation of the pathway 'could offset
some of the traffic demand ... and lessen the increase in traffic congestion,'" was not specific
enough to pass the rough proportionality test: "No precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the
traffic demand generated." Id.
56. For an excellent summary of the requirements of the Dolan test, see Callies, supra
note 12, at 549-50.
57. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994).
58. See Culbro Corp. v. Town of Simsbury, CV 960559508, 1999 Conn. Super LEXIS
551 at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 1 1999) (reviewing twenty percent open-space dedication
requirement under Dolan); River Birch Ass'n v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538, 550 (N.C.
1990) (applying Nollan to forced conveyance of recreational area to home owner's association);
Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (applying Dolan to openspace dedication requirement).
59. See generally Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
highway dedication condition unconstitutional); Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d
Cir. 1995) (applying essential nexus test to strike down requirement that landowners deed
portions of their property in return for water service); Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis
County, 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Nollan and Dolanto strike down requirement
that land developer build drainage system for county); Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of
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tory takings tests, particularly the economically viable use standard articulated
in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil,6° the essential nexus standard is
routinely enforced beyond the halls of the High Court, at least with respect to
dedications of real property."'
The test is hardly as healthy, however, when challenged land use regulations arise from a factual context distinct from that in Nollan and Dolan. In
these situations, there is only agreement that the "rough proportionality" prong
of the essential nexus test does not apply when there is no conditioned permit
at issue.62 When a permit condition is implicated, courts have split along two
key issues, namely whether Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary exactions,
and whether they are relevant to land use conditions imposed by general legislation.
A. The Tenuous Application to Monetary Exactions
The most contentious and most litigated issue to arise from Nollan and
Dolan is whether the essential nexus requirement applies to monetary exacCamas, 990 P.2d 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding exaction of open space reservation
unconstitutional under Nollan and Dolan); Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 354 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding exaction of "right-of-way" unconstitutional under Nollan and Dolan
because "exacted road lacks any tendency to solve or even alleviate the public problems that the
county identifies"); Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 887 P.2d 446, 448 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1995) (noting that dedication requirement is unconstitutional if unrelated to development problem).
60. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, the Court held that a per se regulatory taking occurs
when the government denies all "economically viable use." Unfortunately, some lower courts
have burdened this rule with expansive and controversial exceptions. See R.S. Radford & J.
David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky
Doctrineoflnvestment-BackedExpectations in Regulatory TakingsLaw?,9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
449,472-531 (2001) (discussing Lucas decision and post-Lucas doctrine).
61.
See Callies, supra note 12, at 567 ("Courts since Dolan, both state and federal, appear
to have adopted completely both the nexus and proportionality tests.... ").
62. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999) (declaring that
Dolan was "inapposite" to Del Monte Dunes' challenge of denial of development application);
Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply Nollan
and Dolan to statute limiting hunting on private land); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1002 (Cal. 1999) (holding Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to rent control
challenge); Breneric Ass'n v. City of Del Mar, 69 Cal. App. 4th 166, 175-76 (1998) (holding
Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to denial of building permit); Largent v. Klickitat County, No.
18231-2-Il, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1166, at *15 (Wash. Ct. App. July 6,2000) (refusing to
apply Dolan to denial of road construction variance). But see Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d
634, 641, 651 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (applying Dolan to open space zoning). For a more
extensive summary of cases refusing to apply Dolan to a permit denial, see Richard J. Ansson,
Jr., Dolan v. Tigard's Rough ProportionalityStandard: Why This StandardShould Not Be
Applied to an Inverse Condemnation Claim Based upon Regulatory Denial, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 417 (2000).
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tions. Monetary exactions are often characterized as either "impact fees" or
"in lieu" fees, depending upon whether government initially demands money
or actual capital facilities,63 but the effect is the same: a prospective developer must hand over cash in exchange for government approval and
permits.' In the period between Nollan and Dolan, federal and state courts
consistently refused to extend Nollan to monetary exactions most often by
simply pointing to the fact that Nollan involved an exaction of real
property." All this changed, however, with the Court's decision in Dolan67
63. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 698-99 (Colo. 1996)
(describing differences between impact fees and in lieu fees); see also Hetzel & Gough, supra
note 10, at 237-39 (discussing various characterizations and uses of monetary exactions).
64. Id. The question of the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to these conditions is
of great practical importance to landowners, for in recent years governments increasingly
have turned to them as a way to raise capital for public improvements. See generally James
Berger, Note, ConscriptingPrivateResources to Meet Urban Needs: The Statutory and ConstitutionalValidity ofAffordable HousingImpact Feesin New York, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 911
(1993).
65. See Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding Nollan inapplicable to impact fee designed to provide low-income
housing); Adolph v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 737 (5th Cir. 1988);
Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988); Blue
Jeans Equities West v. City & County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 115 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (holding Nollan inapplicable to San Francisco's Transit Impact Development Fee);
McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (refusing to apply Dolan to
traffic impact fee).
66. See, e.g., CommercialBuilders, 941 F.2d at 874 (noting that no previous cases "have
interpreted [Nollan] as changing the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations that do not
constitute a physical encroachment on land"). CommercialBuilders is a good example of early
judicial attitudes toward monetary exactions. There, the City of Sacramento enacted an
ordinance that required commercial developers to pay a fee "into a fund to assist in the financing
of low-income housing," prior to receiving a building permit. Id. at 873. The ordinance was
premised on a city-commissioned study that found that nonresidential development created "a
need for additional housing in the city" because it tended to attract new employees to the area.
Id. The court agreed "with the City that Nollan does not stand for the proposition that the
exaction ordinance will be upheld only where it can be shown that the development is directly
responsible for the social ill in question." Id. at 875. It subsequently upheld the fee ordinance
despite the "indirectness of the connection between the creation of new jobs and the need for
low-income housing," because "nothing in Nollan or any other authority... requires the nexus
to be more direct than that achieved through the legislative process that the city here employed."
Id. at 876.
67. After Dolan was decided, several courts concluded that the essential nexus requirement could not be limited to exactions of real property. See City of Portsmouth v. Schlesinger,
57 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (striking down $1,792,960 impact fee imposed on residential
housing developer); Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d
384, 387-90 (II1.1995) (applying essential nexus test to traffic impact fee); Castle Homes Dev.,
Inc. v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding monetary exaction
invalid because it was not linked to charged development).
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and the California Supreme Court's decision in the 1996 case of Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City.0
In Ehrlich,the California Supreme Court clearly endorsed the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions.69 The case arose in 1988
when Richard Ehrlich, owner of a failing private tennis and recreational club
in Culver City, California, attempted to amend the city's general plan and
zoning scheme so that he could replace the club with a "30-unit con'dominium
complex. 70 Concerned about the impact of the proposal on recreational space
within its boundaries, the city assured Ehrlich that it would oppose his project
"unless he agreed to build new recreational facilities for the city."'
Ehrlich subsequently indicated a willingness to build tennis courts for the
city, which prompted the city council to approve his project conditioned on
a payment of $280,000. This money was to be provided in-lieu of four new
tennis courts, and was to be used "for additional [public] recreational facilities
as directed by the City Council."" The council also required Ehrlich to

provide "art work," valued at one percent of the project, on the project site, or

a payment of an equivalent amount into a "city art fund." Ehrlich protested,
but when it became clear that the city would not budge, he "agreed to pay the
$280,000 recreation fee under protest in exchange for the necessary building
and grading permits for the project."7 4 However, as soon as the property was
securely developed, Ehrlich initiated suit to have the fees declared unconstiutional under the Fifth Amendment." So began an extended journey up and
down the judicial ladder, with the case ending up in the California Supreme
Court only after a California Court of Appeal appeared to ignore the U.S.
Supreme Court's command that it consider the constitutionality of the fees in
76
light of Dolan.
68.
911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
69. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (holding that
Nollan and Dolan "apply under the circumstances of this case, to the monetary exaction

imposed by Culver City*).
70. Id. at 433-34.
71.
Id. at 434. In the meantime, Ehrlich went ahead and demolished the recreational
facility, donating the left-over recreational equipment to the city. Id.
72. Id. at 435 (quoting from minutes of city council meeting).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The trial cout upheld the $33,200 art fee, but agreed with Ehrlich that the larger
recreational fee violated the Takings Clause because it was not reasonably related to the condominium project This judgment was initially affirmed on appeal, but was later reversed on
rehearing. In its second opinion, the California Court of Appeal held that both fees were
sufficiently related to the project to satisfy the Constitution. The California Supreme Court
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When the case finally came before it, the California Supreme Court
conducted an extensive review of Nollan and Dolan and concluded that they

were meant to apply anytime "the individual property owner seeks to negotiate
approval of a planned development."" This type of bargaining process
triggered the essential nexus because it put government in position to use its
permitting power to appropriate property it would otherwise have to pay for.
[Sluch a discretionary context presents an inherent and heightened risk
that local government will manipulate the police power to impose conditions unrelatedto legitimate land use regulatory ends, thereby avoiding
what would otherwise be an obligation to payjust compensation. In such
a context, the heightened Nollan-Dolan standard of scrutiny works to
dispel such concerns by assuring a constitutionally sufficient link between ends and means. It is the imposition. of land-use conditions in
individual cases, authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature
allows for both the discretionary deployment of the police power and an
enhanced potential for its abuse, that constitutes the sin qua non for
application of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the
court in Nollan and Dolan.79
The court subsequently concluded that the distinction between physical
dedications and monetary exactions was inconsistent with the underlying
rationale ofNollan and Dolan: "In a context in which the constraints imposed

by legislative and political processes are absent or substantially reduced, the
risk of too elastic or diluted takings standard - the vice of distributive justice
in the allocation of civic costs - is heightened in either case. " Rejecting
previous cases that limited the essential nexus to exactions of real property,

the court explicitly held that monetary exactions are subject to essential nexus
then denied Ehrlich's petition for review, prompting him to look for relief in the United States
Supreme Court. That court granted Ehrlich's petition for a writ of certiorari and promptly
returned the case to the California Court of Appeal for reconsideration "in light ofDolan." The
appellate court was unmoved by the Court's remand, upholding the fees in a third opinion.
Ehrlich petitioned the California Supreme Court once more, and this time the court granted
Ehrlich's petition to consider the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions. Id.
at 436.
77. Id. at 438.
78. Id. at 439. The court later summarized as follows:
The essential nexus test is ... intended to limit the government's bargaining
mobility in imposing permit conditions on individual property owners - whether
they consist of possessory dedications or the exaction of cash payments - that,
because they appear to lack any evident connection to the public impact of the
proposed land use, may conceal an illegitimate demand - may in other words,
amount to "out-and-out... extortion."
Id. at 444 (emphasis in original).
79. Id.
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review "when such exactions are imposed - as in this case - neither generally
or ministerially, but on an individual basis .... ,,80
Applying these principles, the court determined that the city's justifications for the $280,000 recreation fee were insufficient to establish the constitutionally required "fit" between exaction and development impact.8 ' The
court was particularly distressed by the city's belief that it could base a fee
intended to fund public tennis courts on the loss of the private courts that
would have existed on Ehrlich's land."2 In the court's view, this equation
failed the proportionality standard because it required the landowner to supply
free and open facilities to a public that had lost only the ability to access

member financed facilities.8 3 This did not mean, however, that the city could

impose no fee, or even that it was barred from charging $280,000, only that
the fee "must be tied more closely to the actual impact of the land-use change
the city granted plaintiff." 4 After suggesting several alternatives, the court
80. Id.
81.
Id. at 447-50. The court determined that the art fee was not a development exaction
at all, but "more akin to traditional land-use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks,
parking and lighting conditions, landscaping requirements, and other design conditions such
as color schemes, building materials and architectural amenities." Id. at 450. Nollan and Dolan
were, therefore, inapposite not because the art fee was a monetary exaction, but because such
design controls traditionally have been upheld as "valid exercises of the city's traditional police
power." Id. The court was of a different mind, however, when it considered the recreational
fee. Because this monetary exaction was one of the "special, discretionary permit conditions
on development by individual property owners," it triggered Nollan and Dolan. Id. at 447.
Applying the nexus test to the recreational fee, the court found that the basic nexus was
"plain" because "the $280,000 fee, which the city has committed to the purchase of additional
recreation facilities, will substantially advance its legitimate interest in correcting a demonstrated deficiency in municipal recreational resources." Id. at 448. It was troubled by the
"rough proportionality" component of the test, though, because the record failed to show
"individualized findings to support the required 'fit' between the monetary exaction and the
loss of a parcel zoned for commercial recreational use." Id. The private nature of the tennis
courts demolished by Ehrlich meant that the public always had less than full rights in them
and, therefore, could not expect full reimbursement for their loss under the "rough proportional-

ity" test:
[-Ynder the city's formula, the public would receive, ex gratia, $280,000 worth of
recreational facilities the cost of which it would otherwise have to finance through

membership fees. Plaintiff is being asked to pay for something that should be paid
for either by the public as a whole, or by a private entrepreneur in business for a
profit. The city may not constitutionally measure the magnitude of its loss, or of
the recreational exaction, by the value of facilities it had no right to appropriate

without payment.
Id. at 449.
82. Id. at 448-49.
83. Id. at 449.
84. Id.
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remanded the case to the city to "reconsider its valuation of the [recreational]
fee in light of the principles we have articulated."85
The decision in Ehrlich lent credence to the few courts that had anticipated a broader and logically consistent application of Nollan and Dolan,"6
and thus altered the constitutional terrain surrounding monetary exactions.
Although a slight majority of post-Ehrlich courts continue to hold the essential nexus test inapplicable to monetary exactions," recently several tribunals
have come to the opposite conclusion. The disagreement rests primarily on
the importance the courts place on the facts in Nollan and Dolan and sometimes on language in the 1999 case of City ofMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes.'
In Krupp v. Breckenridge SanitationDistrict,9' the Colorado Supreme
Court utilized both considerations in refusing to apply Nollan and Dolan to
a District's imposition of a $4000 per unit "plant investment fee" (PIF) on a
residential townhouse project.9' The court, observing that Nollan and Dolan
dealt with the physical dedication of property, initially relied on the traditional
85.

Id.

86. See supra note 67 (citing cases in which courts had concluded that Dolan had
expanded essential nexus requirement).
87. See Henry v. Jefferson County Planning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 698,709 (N.D.W.
Va. 2001); Home Builders Ass'n of Central Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000
(Ariz. 1997) (refusing to apply essential nexus to water district impact fee in part because
district "seeks to impose a fee, a considerably more benign form of regulation" than exaction
of real property); Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 568-69 (Ct.
App. 1997) (refusing to apply essential nexus to S600,000 hotel conversion fee), cert denied,
529 U.S. 1045 (2000); Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 424, 435 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding Supreme Court cases inapplicable "in California
cases involving development fees"); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695
(Colo. 2001) (requiring "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality").
88. See Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356
(Ohio 2000) (applying dual rational nexus test to monetary exaction); Clark v. City of Albany,
904 P.2d 185, 189-90 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (applying Dolan to monetary exaction); Town of
Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd., P'ship, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1209, at **27-28 (Feb.
14, 2002) (applying essential nexus test to road improvement exaction); Honesty in Envtl.
Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d
864, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ("We decline to adopt the dicta that Nollan and Dolan may be
applied only to dedications of land required to allow a development to proceed.").
89.
See Henry, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 709 (noting Court's limit of Dolan test to exactions
and refusal to extend to denials of development proposals); Krupp, 19 P.3d at 697. The relevant

language from Del Monte Dunes is: "Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality
animate the Takings Clause... we have not extended the rough-prop6rtionality test of Dolan
beyond the special context of exactions - land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use." DelMonte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702 (citations
omitted).
90. 19 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2001).
91. Id. at691-92.
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avenue for avoiding application of Nollan and Dolan 2 - that most courts
have limited the essential nexus test to that context, and consequently, that the
essential nexus did not in any way limit the PIF at issue.93 The court explained:
There was no physical taking here. The PIF is not an exaction of land;
rather it is a generally applicable service fee designed to defray the costs
of expanding the wastewater treatment system directly caused by the
new development. Because Nollan, Dolan, and their progeny applied
heightened scrutiny only where the government demanded real property as
a condition of development,
we find that they are not applicable to a
4
general development fee.9
To buttress this conclusion, the court turned to the Supreme Court's statement
in DelMonte Dunes that "we have not extended the rough-proportionality test
of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions - land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public
use."95 The Krupp court declared that this language "made explicit the conclusion that other jurisdictions had been reaching for years," namely, that the
essential nexus requirement is limited to real property exactions.' Although
it later backtracked from this expansive reading of the Del Monte Dunes
dicta," the court ultimately concluded that, as a "generally applicable service
fee" which was "neither a land use regulation nor an exaction of property as
a condition of development," the PIF "does not fall into the relatively narrow
category of development exactions addressed by Nollan and Dolan. ''..
In reaching its holding, the Krupp court minimized the importance of
contemporaneous state court decisions, such as Home Builders Ass'n of
Dayton v. City of Beavercreek," that have applied Nollan and Dolan to
monetary exactions. In Beavercreek, the Ohio Supreme Court faced a question almost identical to that considered in Krupp - whether the essential nexus
test should be applied to an ordinance imposing impact fees on certain devel92. Id. at 695-98.
93. Id. at 697-98.
94. Id. at 697.
95. Id.
96. Id. (stating that "[t]he plain language of City of Monterey suggests that a Nollani
Dolan analysis is appropriate in the narrow circumstance where the government conditions
development on the forfeiture of private property for public use").
97. Id. at 698. The Court appeared to recognize that the context of the language in Del
Monte Dunes and the holding in Ehrlich left room for application of the essential nexus standard to certain monetary exactions. Id.
98. Id.
99. 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000).
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opments for the purpose of funding new roads. 1°° The court reviewed the
standards of scrutiny applied by other courts and, like the Dolan court, opted

for the intermediate reasonable relationship test ultimately incorporated into
federal takings law by Dolan.'0 Although it recognized that the essential
nexus, or as it termed it, the dual rational nexus test,"° evolved from cases
dealing with exactions of real property, the court gave little weight to this
factual distinction:
Although impact fees do not threaten property rights to the same degree as
land use exactions or zoning laws, there are similarities. Just as forced
easements or zoning reclassifications can inhibit the desired use of property, an unreasonable impact fee may affect the manner in which a parcel
of land is developed. Further, impact fees are closer in form to land
exactions than to zoning laws. 03

Thus, in stark contrast to Krupp, the Beavercreek decision placed the
imposition of excessive and arbitrary impact fees upon the same constitutional
plane as demands for physical dedications. 1" To get around the implications
of this holding, the Krupp court blithely dismissed Beavercreek as a case that
"discussed Nollan and Dolan in the context of service fees but ultimately
articulated a 'reasonable relationship"' test.105 Apparently, the Colorado court
100.

Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349,353 (Ohio

2000).
101. See id.
at 355-56 ("This [dual rational nexus] test applies a middle level of scrutiny
that balances the prospective needs of the community against the property rights of the developer.").
102. Id. at 356. Noting its origins in Nollan and Dolan, and a Florida case, Hollywood,
Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983), the court described the "dual
rational nexus test" as follows:
The dual rational nexus test requires a court to determine (1) whether there is a
reasonable connection between the need for additional capital facilities and the
growth in population generated by the subdivision; and (2) if a reasonable connection exists, whether there is a reasonable connection between the expenditure of the
funds collected through the imposition of an impact fee, and the benefits accruing
to the subdivision.
Id. at 354-55.
The first prong of the above test is a reasonable rendition of the Nollan nexus standard.
However, it is notable that second prong differs from Dolan's rough proportionality test by
asking whether the fees benefit the development rather than whether they are proportional to
the development's impact. This difference shows the influence of Hollywood, Inc., in which
the Florida Court of Appeals established that monetary exactions must be used so as to benefit
the charged development in some way. See Hollywood, Inc., 431 So. 2d at 612.
103. Beavercreek,729 N.E.2d at 355.
104. See Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687,698 (Colo. 2001).

105.

Id.

390
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did not realize that Dolan specifically adopted the exact same standard in the

guise of "rough proportionality."''

°

In the 2002 case of Town of FlowerMound v. Stafford Estates, Ltd.,107
the Texas Court of Appeals sided with the Beavercreek court, holding that
there is no basis for applying the heightened scrutiny required by Nollan and

Dolanto exactions ofreal property, but not to demands for money."° In Town

of FlowerMound, the Town required a developer to demolish and replace an

existing asphalt street with a concrete road and three-foot high concrete
shoulders at the developer's expense in return for permission to build a 247-

unit residential subdivision."° Treating the Town's demands as a monetary

exaction, the court concluded that these exactions present the same dangers
as demands for real property and thus that the essential nexus test logically
applies to both situations." ° In so doing, the court rejected the assertion,
accepted by the Krupp court, that DelMonte Dunes limited Nollan andDolan
to dedications of real property.11' It ultimately held that the Town failed to
satisfy the "rough proportionality" test because it did not demonstrate that "the
additional traffic generated by the Subdivision bears a sufficient relationship
to the requirement that Stafford demolish a nearly new, two land asphalt road
11 2
that was not in disrepair and replace it with a two-land concrete road."
Thus, while consensus on the applicability of the nexus test to monetary
exactions continues to allude courts, there is growing recognition that the
logic of Nollan and Dolan apply in such a context and that the Supreme Court
has not otherwise precluded courts from moving in that direction.'"

B. Legislative vs. Adjudicative Exactions
Evan as the split over monetary exactions begins to favor applying
Nollan and Dolan, a controversy over the applicability of the nexus test to
legislative acts continues to retard judicial consistency in application of that
test. Indeed, when courts hold the essential nexus test inapplicable to monetary exactions, the result is occasionally justified not only by the nature of the
exaction, but also by the fact it emanated from a legislative, rather than an
106.
107.
108.
**31-32
109.
110.

111.

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994).
2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1209 (Feb. 14,2002).
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, Ltd., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1209, at
(Feb. 14, 2002).
Id. at**4-6.
Id. at **30-31.

ld. at **26-27.

112. Id. at**59-61.
113. See, e.g., id. at **26-27; Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battleground, 14 P.3d 172,
173 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), rev. granted,2001 Wash. LEXIS 352 (May 2,2001).
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administrative, body." 4 The source of an exaction is, in fact, an important

factor in exactions cases in general, with courts as deeply divided over the
issue as they are over the standard to be applied to monetary exactions."1
The disagreement over legislative exactions traces largely to comments
made by the Dolan Court suggesting that the adjudicative nature of the
exaction was a relevant factor in its decision." 6 Dolan twice drew attention
to the adjudicative nature of the challenged exactions - once in rejecting a
deferential standard normally reserved for "essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city"" 7 and, later, in justifying the placement of the burden to show rough proportionality on the city."8 While the
Court left its implied deference to legislative exactions unexplained, lower
114. See Krupp, 19 P.3d at 698 (concluding that "plant investment fee" was not subject to
the essential nexus test in part because fee "is not imposed adjudicatively in the Nollan/Dolan
sense"); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281,286 (Mn. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding Dolan inapplicable to requirement that mobile home park owners pay "relocation
costs" to displaced tenants because fee flowed from city-wide ordinance).
115. See Callies, supra note 12, at 572 (noting that courts are unclear on "whether to apply
the tests from [Nollan and Dolan] to 'legislative' determinations").
116. See Tex. Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th
Cir. 1996) (citing distinction noted in Dolan about land use regulations that are legislative in
character); Harris v. City of Witchita, 862 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Kan. 1994) (noting Dolan
Court's comments on legislative nature of Dolan regulations and determining that Dolan's
rough proportionality test does not apply in instant case due to legislative nature of regulations
at issue), Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994)
(distinguishing Atlanta ordinance from Dolan because Atlanta ordinance was "a legislative
determination"); Curtis v. Town of S. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998) (relying on
Dolan language about legislative nature of regulation to support conclusion that South
Thomaston's regulation, as example of legislative rule, "more likely represents a carefully
crafted determination of need tempered by the political and legislative process"); see also
Gareau v. City of Seattle, 897 F. Supp. 1318, 1325 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (noting that Dolan
emphasized adjudicative nature of exaction struck down in that case).
117. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,385 (1994). The court stated:
The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited, however, differ in
two relevant particulars from the present case. First, they involved essentially
legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city
made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building
permit on an individual parcel.
Id.
118. Id. at391 n.8. The court further noted:
[Justice Stevens] is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable
zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation
to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. Here, by
contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application
for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly
rests with the city.
Id. (citation omitted).
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courts often cite the lower danger of extortion present in generally applicable
lawmaking. Ehrlich is the leading example." 9
In Ehrlich, the California Supreme Court held that Nollan and Dolan
apply to monetary exactions imposed on a discretionary, individual basis
because they present "a heightened risk that local government will manipulate
the police power to impose conditions unrelatedto legitimate land use regulatory ends. '"' 2° The court subsequently suggested that exactions imposed "generally or ministerially" were likely to be free of such manipulation: "Fees of
this nature may indeed be subject to a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny than
that formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan because the heightened risk
of the 'extortionate use' of the police power to exact unconstitutional conditions is not present."'
The concurring opinion of Justice Stanley Mosk" forcefully elaborated
on the same theme, as did the court's later opinion in the case of Santa
Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court.'23 This trend was further solidified in
the recent case of San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco,'24 in which the Supreme
Court of California held that the City of San Francisco did not engage in a
taking when requiring the owner of a residential hotel to pay $567,000 in
return for permission to convert sixty-two residential units to tourist rooms.' 25
In determining that the fee was subject to deferential review, rather than the
essential nexus test, the court focused on the fact that the fee was imposed
pursuant to a "generally applicable" city ordinance that required all residential
119. See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text (discussing Ehrlich).
120. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 991 P.2d 429,439 (Cal. 1996).
121. Id. at 444. The court additionally noted that "it is not at all clear that the rationale
(and the heightened standard of scrutiny) of Atollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the
exactions takes the form of a generally applicable development fee or assessment." Id. at 447.
122. See id. at 459-61 (Mosk, J., concurring) (advocating heightened scrutiny for development fees imposed by land use regulations). In his concurring opinion, Justice Mosk explained:
This risk [of extortion] diminishes when the fee is formulated according to preexisting statutes or ordinances which purport to rationally allocate the costs of development among a general class of developers or property owners .... But when the
fee is ad hoc, enacted at the time the development application was approved, there
is a greater likelihood that it is motivated by the desire to extract the maximum
revenue from the property owner seeking the development permit, rather than on
a legislative policy of mitigating the public impacts of development or of otherwise
reasonably distributing the burdens of achieving legitimate government objectives.
Id. at 459-60.
123. See Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1002 (Cal. 1999)
(holding Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to rent control challenge).
124.
117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (2002).
125. See San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269,273-74 (2002) (holding
that trial court "properly denied.., the demurrer as to the [taking] action").
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hotels wishing to convert to tourist uses to build replacement
units or pay an
1 26
in-lieu fee sufficient to cover the cost of such units
When state courts outside California reject exaction challenges, they also
tend to point to the general applicability of the condition.'" In ParkingAss 'n
of Georgia, Inc. v. City ofAtlanta,' for instance, the Georgia Supreme Court
relied on the general applicability of a zoning ordinance that required individuals who owned parking lots of thirty spaces or more to bear all the costs of
providing "minimum barrier curbs and landscaping areas equal to at least ten
percent of the paved area within a lot, ground cover (shrubs, ivy, pine bark or
similar landscape materials) and at least one tree for every eight parking
spaces," as a basis for its decision.'" The court refused to apply Dolan
because "[h]ere the city made a legislative determinationwith regard to many
landowners and it simply limited the use the landowners might make of a
small portion of their lands." 3 '
Most courts go one step further and, following Ehrlich, cite the lower
probability of extortion in general legislative acts. In Home BuildersAss 'nof
Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale,' the Arizona Supreme Court turned
back a takings challenge to a "water resources development fee" because the
danger of improper "leveraging [of the police power] does not exist when the
3 2
exaction is embodied in a generally applicable legislative decision."'
Similarly, in Curtis v. Town of South Thomaston,'3 3 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine dismissed a challenge under Dolan to an ordinance requiring
subdivision developers to build "a 250,000 gallon fire pond" and then convey
a "right of way or easement" to the town "[b]ecause the Town's dedication
126. Id. at 288-89.
127. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Az. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000
(Az. 1997) (noting general applicability of Scottsdale's water fee as one reason supporting
court's decision to uphold water fee); Parking Ass'n of Oa., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d
200, 203 (Ga. 1994) (upholding parking lot regulations that apply to lots with thirty or more
spaces); Curtis v. Town of S. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998) (supporting decision
to uphold regulation with argument that conditions on land use were imposed by "a legislative
rule of general applicability").
128. 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994).
129. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200,201-02 (Ga. 1994); see
id. at 203 (refusing to apply Dolan because of general applicability of zoning ordinance).
130. Id. at 203 n.3 (emphasis added). It, therefore, applied a test that "weighs the benefit
to the public against the detriment to the individual." Id. at 202. The court found that there was
no significant detriment to the parking lot owners and, thus, no taking. Id. at 202-03 (quoting
Gradous v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 349 S.E.2d 707,709 (Ga. 1986)).
131. 930 P.2d 993 (Az. 1997).
132. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Az. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 994, 1000 (Az.
1997).
133. 708 A.2d 657 (Me. 1998).
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requirement is a legislative rule, this requirement more likely represents a
carefully crafted determination of need tempered by the political and legislative processes rather than a 'plan of extortion' directed at a particular land
owner.' ' 34 Not all courts find merit in the legislative distinction, however, or
its purported theoretical basis. 35 Oregon courts are particularly skeptical. In
Shultz v. City of Grants Pass,' 36 the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the
city's argument that a land dedication condition imposed by ordinance was not
subject to Nollan and Dolan, stating:
The city insists that, because the relevant ordinances requirethe imposition
of such conditions, the decision to do so is, in reality, a legislative one.
The city misses the point. Even if that were so, the character of the restriction remains the type that is subject to the analysis in Dolan. In drawing
its distinction between the legislative land use decisions that are entitled to
apresumption ofvalidity and the exactions that are not, the Supreme Court
noted that What triggers the heightened scrutiny of exactions is the fact that
they are "not simply a limitation of the use" to which an owner may put his
or her property, but rather a requirement that the owner deed portions of
the property to the local government. 37
The court went one step further in J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamus
County, 31 concluding that the legislative/adjudicative distinction was irrelevant inthe context of monetary as well as real property exactions. 3 9 There,
the court considered whether a condition requiring a prospective developer to
pay all of the costs of road improvements adjacent to his land violated the
Takings Clause. 4" Quoting Shultz, the court stated, "'[T]he character of the
[condition] remains the type that is subject to the analysis in Dolan,' whether
it is legislatively required or a case-specific formulation. The nature, not the
source, of the imposition is what matters."'' To make sure it was being clear,
the court emphasized that "[a] condition on the development of particular
property is not converted into something other than that by reason of legisla134. Curtis v. Town of S. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657,660 (Me. 1998).
135. See J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamus County, 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that "the nature, not the source" of land use regulations is what matters in constitutional
analysis irrespective of whether regulation emanated from legislative or case-specific formulations); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994).
136. 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
137. Shultz v. City of Grant Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (citation
omitted).
138. 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
139. Id. at 365.
140. Id. at 361-62.
141.
Id. at 365 (citation omitted).
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tion that requires it to be imposed."' 42 The court subsequently concluded that
the road improvement fees could not be reconciled with Nollan and Dolan.'43
Several courts outside of Oregon also have refused to adopt the distinction between legislative and administrative exactions. In Amoco Oil Co. v.
Village of Schaumburg," an Illinois appellate court refused to give any
credence to the city's argument that it could "skirt its obligation to pay compensation when taking private property for public use merely by having the
Village Board of trustees pass an 'ordinance' rather than having a planning
commission issue a permit.' ' 4 Accordingly the court held that the city
affected a taking when it conditioned a zoning change on the landowner's
dedication of twenty percent of its property for use in the redesign of an inter-

section. 146 The Washington Supreme Court 147 and a Washington state appeals

court also have applied the essential nexus requirement to a legislative exac14
tion.
IV The Casefor Jettisoning Judicial Exceptions to the
EssentialNexus Requirement
When one looks beyond the bare facts of Nollan and Dolan and examines
the purposes underlying the essential nexus standard, it becomes apparent that
142. Id. at 365 n.1.
143. See id. at 365 (reversing and remanding on issue of road improvements).
144. 661 N.E.2d 380 (Il1.App. Ct. 1995). Illinois courts typically apply a higher standard
of scrutiny to land use exactions than that adopted by the Supreme Court in Nollan and Dolan.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1994). However, the court's rejection of
the legislative/adjudicative distinction in Amoco Oil was premised largely on Justice Thomas's
dissent to a denial of a petition for certiorari in ParkingAs'n of Ga., Inc. v. City ofAtlanta, 515
U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See Amoco Oil
Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("Although not binding
as precedent, we find Justice Thomas's comments particularly persuasive and consonant with
the rationale underlying Dolan and similar cases.").
145. Amoco Oil, 661 N.E.2d at 389.
146. Id. at 381,391-92.
147. See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (citing Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) and applying "rough proportionality" test). In Trimen,
the Washington Supreme Court ignored the legislative/adjudicative distinction in applying
Dolan to an ordinance that made subdivision approvals "contingent upon reservation or dedication of land for the open space and recreational needs of its residents, but which ultimately
required a developer to pay a fee of more than fifty thousand dollars "in lieu of providing open
space." Id. at 189-90.
148. See Honesty in Envtl. Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent Puget Sound Growth
Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d 864, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that Nollan and
Dolan apply to Seattle ordinance that clarified policies to be considered in designating critical
environmental areas).
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the test cannot easily be limited to exactions of real property and/or exactions
imposed administratively. Indeed, those purposes logically call for an integrated doctrine that recognizes the constitutional equivalency of monetary
exactions. Statements from the Supreme Court are consistent with and, in
fact, support such a reading. Indeed, given the lack of a clear basis for distinguishing money from real property for takings purposes, a harmonized exaction doctrine is a rather unremarkable proposition.1 49
149. The applicability of the Takings Clause to money is not fully settled. This is illustrated by the ongoing battle over the constitutionality of state interest on lawyer trust fund
account (IOLTA) programs, which require lawyers to deposit some client funds into interest
bearing bank accounts and then facilitate the transfer of the generated interest to certain groups
providing legal services to the indigent. See generally J. David Breemer, Comment, IOLTA in
the New Millenium: Slowly Sinking Under the Weight of the Takings Clause, 23 U. HAW. L.
REv. 221 (2000) (arguing that IOLTA programs are unconstitutional takings of private property). In 1998, the Supreme Court rejected the time-worn, and often successful, argument that
IOLTA interest was not subject to the Takings Clause because it was public rather than private
property. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 165-72 (1998) (citing rule that
interest follows principle in concluding that IOLTA interest income is private property). After
remand, the Fifth Circuit held that the ppr se takings analysis that applies to physical invasions
of real -property applied to, and required the invalidation of, IOLTA's confiscation of private
funds. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice, 270 F.3d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir.
2001). The Ninth Circuit originally came to a similar conclusion in an IOLTA case arising out
of Washington State, but then reversed itself upon rehearing the case en banc, thus setting upa conflict that may prompt resolution by the Supreme Court. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal
Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that there is "no taking
of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment" for funds that
lawyers deposit in client trust accounts), petition for cerL filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3580 (Mar. 7,
2002) (No. 01-1325).
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals on the applicability of the Takings Clause to
"a general [monetary] liability." See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (plurality
opinion) (holding for plaintiff that application of Coal Act to Eastern "effects an unconstitutional taking"). In Eastern Enterprises,a plurality found that a congressional act requiring a
defunct coal company to contribute money to a private pension fund violated the Takings
Clause, id. at 537, even as the remaining justices indicated that the monetary liability was more
properly challenged under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, in other contexts, a majority of the Court consistently has portrayed money as a form of
property that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found. 524
U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that interest generated by IOLTA accounts is private property
for purposes of Takings Clause); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155
164-65 (1980) (holding that government's attempt to confiscate interest accruing on interpleader fund amounted to taking). Lower federal courts also have reviewed appropriations of
money under traditional takings standards. See, e.g., Student Loan MKtg. Ass'n v. Riley, 104
F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying ad-hoc takings inquiry to "straightforward mandate
[I of cash payment to the government"), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 913 (1997); LTV Steel Co. v.
Shalala (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 53 F.3d 478, 493 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying multi-factor
takings inquiry to act "requiring direct transferis] of funds to the government"), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 913 (1995).
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A. The EssentialNexus Test Should Apply to Monetary Exactions
1. The Purposes of the EssentialNexus Requirement Compel Its
Application to Monetary Exactions
The essential nexus test is grounded primarily in a concern for protecting
individuals from bearing public burdens that should be borne by the public as
a whole." 0 The nexus test reflects that concern by requiring a strong causal
link between development and exaction, thus ensuring that the landowner
rectifies only those public problems that flow from the development. Once
she is required to solve (pay for) problems or a portion of a problem not
arising from her development, a nexus and "rough proportionality" are absent,
and the government has overstepped its authority.'' The causation requirement also weeds out exactions that are motivated by a "plan of out-and-out
extortion" rather than by considerations of public health, welfare, and
safety.' 2 Those exactions that are not needed to offset the actual impact of
development are presumed to flow from an improper desire to obtain property
without5paying
for it and, thus, must be treated as an exercise of condemnation
3
power.'
When courts reject the applicability of the essential nexus test to monetary exactions, they would have us believe that the concerns underlying
Nollan and Dolan alter with the nature ofproperty in danger of appropriation.
But this is clearly not so. A monetary exaction can be used to force a landowner to shoulder a disproportionate share of a public burden just as easily as
150.
See Kmiec, supra note 11, at 1651-52 (stating that one key to understanding Nollan
is its emphasis on preventing societal burdens from being borne by only one landowner); Laitos,
supra note 35, at 905 (explaining one premise behind Takings Clause as being to prevent
individuals from solely bearing societal burdens).
151.
See Laitos, supra note 35, at 905-06 (citing Dolan as example of government overreaching that resulted in taking because government sought to single out Ms. Dolan to bear
burden for greenway construction when government's only "legitimate interest" was in "reducing flooding").
152. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,444 (Cal. 1996) (noting that exactions require heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan). The court explained:
The essential nexus test is ...intended to limit the government's bargaining
mobility in imposing permit conditions on individual property owners - whether
they consist of possessory dedications or the exaction of cash payments - that,
because they appear to lack any evident connection to the public impact of the
proposed land use, may conceal an illegitimate demand - may, in other words,
amount to "out-and-out... extortion."
Id.
153.
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (stating "the lack of
nexus... converts that [police power] purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose.").
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a demand for a dedication of real property; all that is required is that the
appropriated money be designed to address a problem unrelated to the owner's
use of property"5 4 or be in an amount that is excessive for addressing the

problems that do arise from the property.'

For instance, in Ehrlich,the city

wanted Ehrlich to pay to solve a deficiency in public recreational facilities
that existed before he ever sought a zoning reclassification." Further, it is
impossible to see how monetary exactions are immunized by their nature from
acting as a vehicle of government extortion." 7 The law identifies extortion
by looking at the characteristic pattern of behavior, not by examining the
specific content of the extortionist's demands. In Nollan, the Court implicitly
made this point when it observed that, as a measure of extortion, the essential
nexus test would preclude government from conditioning the right to shout
"fire" in a theater upon payment of a $100 tax.ss
2. The Supreme CourtHas Not Limited the EssentialNexus'
Requirement to Real PropertyExactions
As we have seen, some courts like to justify the preclusion of the essential nexus test from monetary exactions on the ground that this "extension" is
disfavored by the High Court.5 9 In reality, the Supreme Court has sent the

opposite signals, even though it has not yet given definitive word on the
subject. Ehrlich was, after all, remanded to the California court to be recon154. See Laitos, supra note 35, at 905 (noting that when "condition or restriction is imposed
on a property owner who has not caused the problem that the government action is designed to
correct, then the owner is being singled out and the Takings Clause might be violated").
155. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393 (holding that public easement was excessive means
to address flood problems that might arise from landowner's proposed development).
156. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434. The city recognized it had a deficit of recreational facilities
in 1974, a year before Ehrlich even opened the private club that he later hoped to replace with
condominiums. Id.
157. See San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 623 at *55 ("[Llegislatively
mandated fees do present some danger of improper leveraging."); Honesty in Envtl. Analysis
& Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d 864, 871
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ("Other [nonreal property] conditions exacted to obtain development
permits may differ in degree of burden short of a taking, but do not differ in kind."), see also
Cordes, supra note 11, at 542 ("[T]he primary concern behind the Dolan test - that local
governments will use their monopoly power to seek exactions unrelated to the impact of
development - applies equally to impact fees as well as to physical exactions.").
158. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The court stated: "[E]ven though, in a sense, requiring a
$100 tax contribution in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban,
it would not pass constitutional muster." Id.
159. See, e.g., Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001)
("Recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court strongly indicate that the
Nollan/Dolantest is limited to exactions involving the dedication of property.").
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sidered in light of Dolan.6" The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
this event is that at least some members of the Court viewed the essential
nexus test as being relevant to impact fees at that time. A recent dissent to a
denial of certiorari in Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco"" suggests
that at least three justices still adhere to that view - even in the context of
permit denials. 62
In the Lambert dissent, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas expressed
regret that the Court chose not to review a case in which the City of San
Francisco denied a hotel owner the right to convert some residential hotel
rooms to commercial use after he refused to pay $600,000 to the city. 63 The
critical issue was whether a California appellate court erred in refusing to
apply Nollan and Dolan to the permit denial. While Justice Scalia saw the
case as presenting an important unanswered question as to whether the essential nexus test indeed applies to a permit denial premised on an unpaid exaction,' there is no suggestion that the issue hinged on the nature of the exaction. On the contrary, the dissent clearly assumes that Nollan and Dolan are
applicable to monetary exactions, if not permit denials:
When there is uncontested evidence of a demand for money or other
property - and still assuming that denial of a permit because of failure to
meet such a demand constitutes a taking - it should be up to the permitting
authority to establish either (1) that the demand met the requirements of
Nollan andDolan, or (2)that denial would have ensued even ifthe demand
had been met. 65
In fact, the dissent ultimately concludes that summary reversal and "remand
for conduct of the Nollan-Dolananalysis" would be warranted if the appellate
court's decision was based on a finding that the owner's refusal to pay the
$600,000 fee played a minimal or negligible role in the permit denial.'" On
the other hand, Scalia would have granted the petition and scheduled argu160. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231, 1231 (1994).
161.
529 U.S. 1045 (2000).
162. See Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048-49 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criticizing Court's decision to refuse to hear
case involving demand by government that developer pay $600,000 to obtain permit to convert
apartments).
163. Id. at 1045-46, 1049 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

164. See id. at 1048 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that lower
court's "refusal to apply Nollan and Dolan might rest upon the distinction that it drew between
the grant of a permit subject to an unlawful condition and the denial of a permit when an

unlawful condition is not met").
165.
166.

Id. at 1047-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Id. at 1049 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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ment if the lower court premised its decision on the distinction "between the
grant of a permit subject to an unlawful condition and the denial of a permit
when an unlawful condition is not met."167 In any case, the three dissenting
justices assume that the essential nexus requirement applies to monetary
exactions when a landowner is granted a permit subject to such a condition.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court thinks otherwise," 6a Del Monte
Dunes does not undermine the conclusion that the essential nexus test applies
to monetary exactions.'69 In fact, it is completely inapposite. This is clear
when the Court's statement that it had "not extended the rough-proportionality
test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions - land-use decisions
conditioning approval of development on dedication of property to public use
[citations]""10 is read in context.
The Del Monte Dunes Court made this statement about Dolan while
reviewing the Ninth Circuit's decision to allow application of the rough proportionality test to Del Monte Dunes' claim that denial of a development
permit resulted in a compensable taking. Exactions contemplated by the City
of Monterey were left unchallenged by Del Monte Dunes and were never an
issue before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court's allusion to Dolan
cannot be read as creating a rule precluding heightened scrutiny of monetary
exactions. As the Texas Court of Appeals explained, "The fact that the Supreme Court has not yet applied the Dolan test to a development exaction of
fees or public improvements, as opposed to a dedication of land, does not mean
that the Dolan test does not apply.""' Indeed, DelMonteDunes simply articulates the unremarkable principle that Dolan's"rough proportionality" test does
not apply to outright permit denials." 2 As a result, the Court's remand of
Ehrlich and the dissent to denial of certiorari in Lambert are the only viable
indicators of the Court's thinking on the applicability ofthe essential nexus test
167. Id. at 1048-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
168. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (noting Colorado Supreme Court's use
ofDelMonte Dunes dicta to support conclusion in Krupp that Nollan and Dolan do not apply
to monetary extractions).
169. See Honesty in Envtl. Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth
Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d 864, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (declining to adopt dicta ofDel
Monte Dunes that Nollan and Dolan apply "only to dedications of land required to allow a
development to proceed").
170. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
171.
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, Ltd., 2002 Tex App. LEXIS 1209, at *26
(Feb. 14,2002).
172. Id. at *25 ("The Del Monte Dunes holding is logical. If no exaction, i.e., no action
or concession is required of the landowner, a determination cannot be made about whether the
action or concession ...is roughly proportional to the public consequences of the requested
land use.").
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to monetary exactions. These actions declare what the purposes of the test
clearly imply: the nexus standard does not vary in applicability according to
whether the government chooses to appropriate real property or money.
B. Courts Should Apply the EssentialNexus Requirement
to Legislative Exactions
There is as little to support a lower level of scrutiny for exactions levied
pursuant to legislative acts as there is to justify an exception from essential
nexus review for monetary exactions. 73 As one commentator puts it,
"[a]lthough the distinction between legislative and adjudicative functions of
government has important procedural implications, it is not at all clear that the
distinction should have any relevance with respect to the substantive protection of property rights."'"4 In fact, the distinction is not only meaningless from
the landowner's point of view, but also inconsistent with the principles
underlying Nollan and Dolan and the Takings Clause in general. It is also an
impracticable standard for courts to apply.
.' Nollan and Dolan Apply to Legislative Acts as Partof the
UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine
In Dolan, the Court suggested that its decision sprang from the broader
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine,'75 which, to simplify, holds that
government may not seek a waiver of a constitutional right in return for a
discretionary governmental benefit. 76 Although there are reasons for believ173. See Callies, supra note 12, at 567-68 (noting that "there appears to be little doctrinal
basis beyond blind deference to legislative decisions to limit [the essential nexus and proportionality doctrines] application only to administrative or quasi-judicial acts of government
regulators"); Cordes, supra note 11, at 539 ("The better view is that Dolan should apply to
permit conditions even when imposed pursuant to legislative requirements.").
174. James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction,25
ENvTL. L. 143, 150 (1995).
175. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). The Court introduced the
issue in Dolan with the following statement:
In Nollan ... we held that governmental authority to exact such a condition
was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the
well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional right - here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use - in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the
benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.
Id.
176. See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public
Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859,859 (1995) ("The unconstitutional conditions doctrine directs
courts not to enforce certain contracts that waive constitutional rights.").

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 373 (2002)
ing that Nollan andDolan should not be viewed as unconstitutional conditions

cases, "' the question is clearly open to debate."' In any case, to the extent
that Nollan and Dolan flow from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
courts should not limit the essential nexus test to administrative exactions

because no distinction between legislative and administrative conditions exists
in unconstitutional conditions cases involving other constitutional provisions. " 9 On the contrary, in many of these decisions, courts have held generally applicable legislation unconstitutional.'8 If the Fifth Amendment is as
much a part of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as the First Amendment,8 the essential nexus test must be equally relevant to suspect legislative

conditions.
2. Generally Applicable Takings Are Still Takings
The notion that legislative exactions are generally applicable, rather than

directed toward particular individuals, is not a sufficient basis for diminishing
the potency of the Fifth Amendment and of the Takings Clause. The assumption that exaction legislation is generally applicable is itself dubious,"8 2 but
even if true, that trait logically cannot alter the constitutional nature of the
177. See Laitos, supra note 35, at 904 (arguing that Dolan rests on purposes of Takings
Clause rather than on unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
178. See RICHARDA. EPsTEiU, BAROAMINOWrrIHTHE STATE 179-84 (1993) (arguing that
Nollan implicates doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Merrill, supra note 176, at 886-88
(arguing that Dolan can be viewed as unconstitutional conditions case grounded in concern for
positive externalities associated with strong Fifth Amendment).
179. Many federal unconstitutional conditions cases deal with challenges to statutorily
imposed conditions. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,203 (1991) (permitting Congress
to condition health care funding on restrictions on speech encodraging abortion); Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1983) (upholding power of Congress to
condition tax-exempt status for nonprofit groups on their willingness to give up lobbying).
180. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995)
(striking down federal statute that banned certain government employees from making speeches
or writing articles); Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272-77 (1991) (striking down federal law conditioning disposal of
federal property in way that undermines executive branch power); FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (holding that Congress may not condition broadcasting grants
on agreement not to broadcast editorials).
181. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or the Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in
these comparable circumstances.").
182. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (explaining difficulties in determining
whether exaction is product of legislative or adjudicative action, as well as noting that most
local land use decisions involve individual development and thus are individualized to some
degree).
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underlying acts. From the landowner's point of view, there is nothing magical
about the fact that a law that takes property applies equally to a large number
of people. Justice Thomas drove home this point in his dissent from a denial
of certiorari in ParkingAss 'n of Georgia:

It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of
governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city council can take
property just as well as a planning commission can. Moreover, the general
applicability of the ordinanceshould not be relevant in a takings analysis.
IfAtlanta had seized several hundred homes in orderto build afreeway,
there would be no doubt thatAtlanta had taken property. The distinction
between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative
takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.'
The assertion that legislative or generally applicable exactions are
immune from the extortionate impulse"5 4 adds nothing to support the legislative/adjudicative distinction. Courts rarely explain in depth the idea that
legislators are less likely to abuse landowners via an exaction, but the implicit
justification seems to be that an open legislative process affords greater

protection against governmental abuse than the insular adjudicative process."'
While this may be true as a general proposition, it too cavalierly dismisses the

fact that procedural mechanisms designed to protect the minority often break
down in the legislature as well as in the administrative context." 6 Indeed, as
the branch most accountable, and thus most responsive, to the majority, the

legislature may be especially prone to extort disproportionate amounts of
183. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).
184. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (noting courts that found legislative/adjudicative distinction irrelevant).
185. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 623, at *55 (Mar 4,'
2002) ("[S]uch generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the
democratic political process. A city council that charged extortionate fees for all property
development, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely face widespread and well-financed
opposition at the next election."); Curtis v. Town of St. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me.
1998) ("Because the'Town's dedication requirement is a legislative rule, this requirement more
likely represents a carefully crafted determination of need tempered by the political and legislative processes rather than a 'plan of extortion' directed at a particular land owner."); WHIJAM
A. FISCHEL, REoULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POu'rics 329 (1995) (arguing that
"state legislatures that create general police-power laws should receive great deference" because
this type of regulation is "more like an exogenous event ... and more subject to logrolling of
pluralistic politics," both of which reduce "the demoralization of apparently being singled out").
186. See FISCHEL, supra note 185, at 100-39 (proposing a sliding scale of judicial scrutiny
of property regulation that increases as level of government authority decreases). This framework is premised on the idea that smaller legislatures "would discount the welfare of underrepresented outsiders. Local insiders can use regulation in a way that subverts the Constitution's clear commands not to take property without compensation." Id. at 139.
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property from under-represented groups.'" As California Supreme Court
Justice Brown explained in a dissenting opinion in San Remo:
[Tihe majority's exception for legislatively created permit fees is mere
sophism, particularly where the legislation affects a relatively powerless
group and therefore the restraints inherent in the political process can
hardly be said to have worked. If the agency in Nollan had passed a rule
requiring all beachfront property owners to dedicate an easement as a
condition of developing their properties, those easements would have no
better mitigated the effects of development (and they would have been no
I

less objectionable) than the easement that the agency exacted adjudica-

tively.'
The founding fathers also recognized and feared the threat to minority
rights presented by the legislative power:
It would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our
choice to silence our fears for the safety of our rights ....
Confidence is
everywhere the parent of despotism. Free government is founded in
jealousy, and not in confidence. It is jealousy and not confidence which
prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are obliged
to trust with power....
'

Their answer was, of course, the Constitutioni" and, more specifically, the
Takings Clause: "In a constitutional system which values both democracy and
liberty, the beauty of the takings clause is that it provides a solution to the
difficult problem of protecting individual rights in the face of legitimate
government actions which often impact arbitrarily and unevenly on isolated
19
individuals." 1

It is unclear why courts believe human nature or legislators have changed
so much that an invasion of property rights by "men and women of our
choice" should be scrutinized with more "confidence" today. Today's democratic legislative process is entirely conducive to forcing a landowning minority to shoulder an unfair portion of a general public burdens, in accordance
187. See FISCHEL, supra note 185; Huffman, supra note 174, at 152 (observing that "even
properly functioning democracies can abuse power at the expense of individuals and minorities.
The [Tjakings [C]lause, like the equal protection clause, protects against this majoritarian tyranny").
188. San Remo, 2002 Cal. LEUS 623, at **122-23 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
189. THOMAs JEFFERSON, DRAFT KENTUCKYRESOLUTIONS (Mem'l Ed. 17:388) (1798).
190. Id. ("Our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which, and no further, our
confidence may go .... In questions ofpower then let no more be heard of confidence in man,
but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
191. Huffman, supra note 174, at 145 (emphasis added).
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with the will of a non-landowning majority.

Thus, in San Remo, San Fran-

cisco's elected officials legislated the burden of ameliorating a city-wide
housing shortage - and the associated homelessness - upon approximately 500
hotel owners.' 93 Because the risk of government extortion is present in the
legislative setting, the essential nexus test cannot reasonably, be limited to
exactions imposed pursuant to an adjudicative process.' 94

3. The Legislative-AdjudicativeDistinctionIs Difficult to Apply in
Any Meaningful Way
Even if there were some valid reason to uphold the principle of special
deference to general legislative exactions - which there is not - the rule is
extremely difficult to apply in the land use context. 9 An initial problem is
that there is no logically consistent way to pinpoint the source of an exaction
because they typically reach the landowner only after the involvement of both
legislative and adjudicative bodies." Moreover, little can be implied even
when the source of an exaction is clear; in the land use process, legislative
192. See James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of
Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CoNSTIrrUTIoNAL ECONOMICS 4 (James D.
Gwartney & Richard E.Wagner eds., 1988) ("At least with regard to economic functions and
rights, we no longer possess a constitutionally limited government Congressional majorities
are now largely free to legislate as they choose, with government being limited only by the
requirements of electoral competition."); Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative andAdjudicativeDecisionsin Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 242, 271 (2000)
("[Llegislative land use decisions made at the local level may reflect classic majoritarian
oppression. And developers, whose interests judicial rules like Dolan aim to protect, are precisely the kind of minority whose interests might actually be ignored."). See generally TOWARD
A THEORY OF THE RENT SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (describing
process by which individuals and groups use the legislative process to effect transfers of wealth
from one group to another).
193. See San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 623, at 0*134-35 (Mar. 4,
2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
194. See CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 66000-66020. In providing a procedure by which a
landowner may challenge - under the "reasonable relationship" test - any type of monetary
exaction, "whether established for a broad class of projects by legislation of general applicability or imposed on a specific project on an ad hoc basis," the California legislature has recognized that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing among exactions based on their place
of origin.
195. See Reznik, supra note 192, at 257-66 (surveying proposed methods to apply legislative/adjudicative distinction in exaction arena and concluding that all are "difficult to use in
practice").
196. See, e.g., Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr.
2d 424, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding imposition of fee on university by school district
when legislature granted school district power to decide amount of fee based on findings of
school board).
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bodies often act in an administrative capacity and vice versa." Focusing on
the extent to which a decision is discretionary as a means to identify adjudicative exactions provides no solution because most local land use decisions,
including exactions, must be tailored to fit an individual development at some
point and, therefore, necessarily involve a certain amount of discretion.""
Lambert exemplifies the foregoing principles.'" Like San Remo, Lambert involved a generally applicable law requiring hotel owners to pay a fixed
percentage (raised in 1990 from forty percent to eighty percent) of the cost of
replacing residential rooms as a condition of obtaining a permit to convert
such rooms to tourist units." However, the law allowed local government
administrators to determine the underlying "replacement" value on a case-bycase basis.2"' Under this framework, an administrative board set Mr. Lanbert's portion of the cost of replacing thirty-one residential rooms at $600,000,
even though the city's appraisers had differed substantially in their estimates
of the likely actual cost. 2°2 Thus, although the exaction could rightfully be
described as legislative, the fee ultimately was imposed pursuant to the exercise of administrative discretion.
There will, of course, be a few cases in which exactions are clearly legislative in nature. The art fee imposed in Ehrlich comes to mind. That fee
arose under an ordinance that required all
197. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (refusing to recognize legislative/adjudicative distinction). In Amoco Oil Co., a legislatively adopted ordinance directed a single zoning applicant to deed a portion of its property to
the Village in return for favorable zoning. Id. at 381. The court's response to this fact is instructive:
[W]e also note that the so-called "ordinance"at issue here did not itself reflect a
uniformly applied legislative policy. Indeed, the dedication requirement was
clearly site-specific and adjudicative in character. As such, even if we were to
recognize the distinction between legislative and adjudicative actions, which we are
not inclined to do under the circumstances of this case, we would still apply the
two-part approach set forth in Dolan ....
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
198. See Reznik, supra note 192, at 264 ("[T]he legislative/adjudicative test is misplaced
in a land use system where development proceeds mainly on a piecemeal, individualized basis
in response to developer requests, and therefore few decisions, by the terms of the (discretionary] test, can be categorized as legislative.").
199. Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 562,564-68 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (concluding that ordinance and planning code amendment restricting landowner from
converting residential hotel units to tourist hotel units was not taking), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1045 (2000).
200. Id. at 564.
201.
See id. at 570 (Strankman, P.J., dissenting) (noting that replacement value was determined by appraisals through Department of Real Estate).
202. Id. The appraisers estimated the actual cost to be between $484,584 and $612,887.
Id.
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new residential development projects of more than four units, as well as all
commercial, industrial, and public building projects with abuilding valuation exceeding $500,000 ... to provide. "art work" (as defined by the
ordinance) for the project in an amount equal to 1 percent of the total
building valuation, or to pay an equal amount in cash to the city art fund. 3
Yet, broadly applicable and discretion-free laws are rarities in the exaction
context. As such, they are exceptions that tend to prove the rule, rather than

a norm that might justify a special exemption from the essential nexus standard.

V Conclusion
Courts are increasingly rejecting the idea that Nollan and Dolan can be
limited to their facts, and rightly so. The principles underlying the essential
nexus requirement are as relevant to monetary exactions as they are to exactions ofreal property and as necessary to protect against legislative abuses of
power as against administrative extortion.2 There is, therefore, no compelling reason to avoid applying Nollan and Dolan to all exactions. 05 At the
203. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,435 (Cal. 1996).
204. See Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hasp., 643 N.E.2d 479,483 (N.Y. 1994) (applying
Nollan and Dolan to a rent control law and stating that "the Supreme Court refrained from
placing any limitations or distinctions or classifications on the application of the 'essential
nexus' test. This suggests and supports a uniform, clear and reasonably definitive standard of
review in takings cases.").
205. Judicial willingness to expand Nollan and Dolan to their logical limits could, of
course, founder on the."slippery slope." The fear that stronger scrutiny of legislative monetary
exactions will bring the courts perilously close to opening the door to attacks on the current
system of property taxation is a potential psychological bar. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. San
Francisco, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 623, at *57 (Mar. 4, 2002). It should not be. Unlike monetary
exactions, which typically flow from statutory authority, general ad valorem property taxes are
almost always authorized by a constitution. In part for this reason, it is well settled that the
basic form of property taxation is not subject to a takings claim unless it is arbitrary or overtly
discriminatory. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584-85 (1937) (upholding
taxation scheme of Social Security Act against Fifth Amendment challenge); Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1916) (determining that federal tax laws do not infringe
ofFifth Amendment, as long as taxation is not "arbitrary ... confiscation of property"). On the
other side of the coin, it is important to recognize that some species of property taxation are
already subject to a crude version of the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. In
particular, courts generally require special benefit assessments on property to be related to and
proportional to an increase in property value flowing from expenditure of the assessments. See
McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 379 A-2d 446, 451 (N.J. 1977) (stating that "[e]xaction of
more than the special benefit to the property owner would constitute a taking of private property
for public use without compensation"). The extension of the essential nexus requirement to its
natural extremes simply would put property exactions in the same class, for constitutional
purposes, as other, similar burdens on real property while in no way jeopardizing more general
forms of taxation.
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same time, a robust essential nexus test is necessary to facilitate both the
broadest purposes of the Takings Clause and the narrowest holding of Nollan
and Dolan. Without a strong essential nexus test, individuals often will be
forced to bear burdens that properly should be borne by the public as a
whole. 2" At the same time, the Court's widely accepted prescription against
unrelated and excessive demands for physical dedications of land is one small
step away from becoming meaningless if a local government can bypass the
essential nexus test simply by "utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle."2 '°
Similarly, if government may exact exorbitant sums of money freely, only the
Legislature's good will can stop it from imposing such demands to raise cash
to buy the same land that it could not otherwise get directly under Nollan.
The essential nexus cannot survive long when riddled with these loopholes.
Application of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions and legislative
exactions is not only the logical end of the evolution of the essential nexus, it
is also the necessary beginning to ensuring that their core outcomes are the
constitutional legacy of all landowners, not just the Nollans and Ms. Dolan.

206. See supra notes 150-51 (explaining that Takings Clause is in place to prevent individuals from bearing societal burdens alone).
207. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 66.1 N.E.2d 380, 390 (IIl. App. Ct. 1995)
("Certainly, a municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely
by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property.").

